the grammar of morality

this one is kinda weird, hang with me.

think about how you know grammar rules. the weird ones in english. things like how “you oughtn’t do that” looks right, but “you ought’nt do that” doesn’t. there are rules, lots of them, but that’s not how you learned is it? you just know that some things are right just by looking at them, and some things are not. it’s instant, and often hard to explain people who are still learning english.

now, consider the possibility that morality works in the same way as language: absorbed at a formative age by what we see in others, with rules being created later to explain our own reactions to ourselves. note that when you see something that requires a moral judgement, you don’t consult a rulebook, but instead know. even in ambiguous situations, our response isn’t to start following a logical process and try and resolve it, but usually to freeze and be not sure what to do.

what if all our rules for morality, all the religious, philosophical, societal, etc ponderings are all just navel gazing of the “is it ok to split an infinitive” type? what if we already know the answers based on what feels right to us, and instead just argue because black-and-white rules make us feel more comfortable with ourselves?

ambiguity is scary, and so is the idea that everything holding our societies together might not actually be imposed by laws, gods, or anything of the sort, and the moral failings of others are as mutable as their desire to spell ‘you’ as ‘u’